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NO. 23 MAY 2020 Introduction 
Implementing and Enforcing 
UN Arms Embargoes 
Lessons Learned from Various Conflict Contexts 
Judith Vorrath 
The Berlin Conference on Libya in January 2020 was held to support United Nations 
(UN) conflict-resolution efforts. The participating states’ commitment to the existing 
arms embargo garnered particular attention. But hopes of meaningful progress were 
quickly dashed, with the embargo violated yet again shortly after the conference. 
Indeed, the implementation and enforcement of UN arms embargoes is fraught with 
challenges, especially prominently in the case of Libya. But closer examination of 
existing embargoes in the context of armed conflict also reveals opportunities for 
making better use of the measure, which is the most frequently used form of UN sanc-
tions. It goes without saying that no arms embargo can save a peace process on its 
own, however tightly it is monitored. But the instrument can be applied to greater 
effect as part of an overall package of conflict resolution measures. 
 
The Head of the United Nations Support 
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Stephanie 
Williams, complained in February that the 
UN arms embargo had “become a joke”. 
In fact, UNSMIL had just reported on flights 
landing advanced weapons, armoured 
vehicles and fighters at airports in the west-
ern and eastern parts of the country. While 
such violations are in principle nothing 
new, these incidents occurred right after 
the Berlin conference where the twelve par-
ticipating states committed to fully respect-
ing and implementing the existing arms 
embargo. This appeared to confirm long-
standing criticisms of UN sanctions. There 
can be no doubt that repeated and more or 
less open violations harm the credibility of 
the embargo – and of the responsible 
states. But the lessons from Libya cannot 
simply be transferred to other situations, 
particularly as arms embargoes are the 
type of sanctions most frequently imposed 
by the UN Security Council. Nine of the ten 
current conflict-related sanctions regimes 
include arms embargoes (Somalia, Iraq, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, 
Libya, Taliban, Central African Republic, 
Yemen, South Sudan). One reason for this 
may be that restricting the conflict parties’ 
access to arms and related materiel is such 
an obvious response. Furthermore, arms 
embargoes – like other UN Security Coun-
cil sanctions – must be observed by all 
member states, but rarely have negative 
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humanitarian impacts. This is probably 
why the debate about the Berlin Conference 
conclusions – which actually covered a 
wide range of aspects concerning conflict 
resolution in Libya – initially revolved 
largely around the UN arms embargo. Ulti-
mately the member states are, of course, 
responsible for deficiencies in the imple-
mentation and enforcement of embargoes, 
as in the Libyan case. But there are possible 
courses of action at UN level. 
Deadlock in the Security Council, above 
all among permanent members, is usually 
seen as the main obstacle here. But closer 
examination of all current UN arms embar-
goes in conflict contexts reveals a more 
differentiated picture, with starting points 
for action in three areas. 
Adapt Embargoes to Dynamic 
Conflict Situations 
Arms embargoes prohibit the supply or 
transfer of arms and related materiel to 
specific areas or actors. They often remain 
in force for longer periods: the arms em-
bargo on Somalia has been in place since 
1992. They entail direct obligations to act 
on UN member states – unlike travel bans 
for example, which have to be imposed 
individually. But unless their objectives 
and reach are adjusted to keep pace with 
dynamically evolving situations, arms 
embargoes risk becoming purely symbolic. 
Over time UN arms embargoes have 
tended to become more comprehensive and 
more precise. In Libya for example many of 
the conflict parties are today applying dif-
ferent military means than they were in 
2011, and increasingly make use of foreign 
fighters. But today’s UN arms embargoes in-
clude arrangements for such developments. 
While the embargo imposed on Iraq in 
2003 simply prohibits the “the sale or sup-
ply to Iraq of arms and related materiel”, 
all other current arms embargoes in conflict 
contexts also cover technical advice, finan-
cial assistance, and training related to 
military activities. The arms embargo on 
Libya – like those on South Sudan and 
Central African Republic – also explicitly 
prohibits the provision of armed mercenary 
personnel. 
The Security Council also modifies indi-
vidual UN arms embargoes with substantial 
changes and reference to the conflict situa-
tion in the target area. The now widespread 
practice of time-limiting sanctions is help-
ful for this. They require regular extensions 
and therefore, a constant review of the 
situation on the ground. 
There can be deadlocked situations. The 
arms embargo against Sudan/Darfur was 
tightened slightly but never expanded to 
cover Sudan as a whole, largely on account 
of Chinese objections. Thus, it was almost 
impossible to control and largely ineffective. 
But that is not the normal case. Despite the 
controversial nature of the Western inter-
vention in Libya, the Security Council was 
still able to agree on relevant changes to the 
open-ended arms embargo – relaxations 
in 2011 and 2013 and a renewed tightening 
after fighting flared up again in 2014. 
In most cases Security Council amend-
ments are designed to differentiate the 
embargo, above all through exemptions. 
These exist in all conflict-related regimes 
today, with the exception of the measures 
against the Taliban. Exemptions allow 
for deliveries of non-lethal equipment for 
humanitarian purposes for example, or 
military supply to peace operations, but 
also for the capacity-building of national 
security forces. In almost all cases, such a 
possibility to support and train national 
security forces – which otherwise would 
be covered by the embargo – is foreseen. 
The arms embargo on DR Congo has gen-
erally applied only to non-state actors since 
2008. 
Such an easing is often justified by the 
Security Council with reference to changes 
on the ground, for example the installa-
tion of a civilian transitional government 
or largely free and fair elections held. So 
actual events do matter, but they are natu-
rally interpreted by the Council. Where 
miscalculations occur it may become im-
possible to implement an embargo effec-
tively. 
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Even if adjustments are timely and 
appropriate, they are not easy to implement 
and monitor. Exemptions may create new 
loopholes. Moreover, their conditions may 
be complex, as is the case with the wide-
spread requirement to notify the relevant 
sanctions committee or seek its advance 
approval. If arms embargoes are to have 
the intended impact, alterations and their 
objectives must be clearly formulated and 
communicated to the member states, espe-
cially those in the affected region. 
Using the Mechanisms in the 
UN Sanctions System 
Not all UN member states possess sophisti-
cated systems for controlling the export 
and transit of goods. Yet, this is a crucial 
prerequisite for effective sanctions regimes, 
alongside translating Security Council sanc-
tions into national law and involving the 
private sector. Furthermore, law enforce-
ment in many UN member states is ill-
equipped to pursue violations. 
It is therefore crucial to strengthen these 
capacities in member states. This already 
occurs fairly comprehensively in relation 
to measures against terrorism and nuclear 
proliferation, but in the case of sanctions 
designed to contain or resolve conflicts 
much work remains to be done. Relevant 
starting points can still be found in the out-
comes of the Bonn-Berlin Process, which Ger-
many initiated in 1999 to support national 
implementation of UN arms embargoes. 
But it is a fine line between inadequate 
capacity and conscious evasion and vio-
lation. Therefore, mechanisms to improve 
the implementation and enforcement of 
sanctions have been put in place within 
the UN system. First of all, arms embargoes 
are no longer configured as stand-alone 
measures. Since that approach proved largely 
ineffective, they are now usually imposed 
in conjunction with commodity bans and/or 
asset freezes, to hinder the financing of 
arms purchases. 
In Libya for example a ban on illicit ex-
ports of crude oil and refined petroleum 
products is part and parcel of the sanctions 
regime. But conflict parties that receive 
direct military support from third states 
are less dependent on such sources of fund-
ing. The sometimes open interventions 
by Rwanda and Uganda in DR Congo, thus, 
triggered a Security Council decision on 
aviation and customs controls at the coun-
try’s eastern borders. And in 2009 second-
ary sanctions were imposed on Eritrea for 
assisting Al-Shabaab in Somalia. But such 
firm Security Council responses to viola-
tions by states are relatively rare, especially 
when the interests of permanent members 
are involved. 
Another approach is listing individuals 
and entities involved in breaching an em-
bargo. Almost all the nine current arms 
embargoes provide for the possibility to re-
spond to violations with travel bans or asset 
freezes. But very few individuals and en-
tities are actually listed on these grounds: 
to date three for Somalia, one for Sudan 
and four for the Taliban. Only in the case of 
DR Congo has a larger number been listed 
for this reason, partly because until the end 
of 2005 violating the arms embargo was the 
only criterion available for listing. Today 
the tendency is to establish more and more 
differentiated listing criteria. But it would 
also be important to actually apply the 
existing criteria in the UN sanctions system 
when violations occur. 
Identify Violations and Respond 
Listing of individuals and entities is usually 
carried out by the sanctions committees 
established by the Security Council. How-
ever, the reason why violations often have 
little consequence is not simply that the 
committees are composed of the same fif-
teen member states as the Security Council. 
Because the committee makes its decisions 
by consensus, each member – not just the 
permanent ones – possesses an effective 
veto. Additionally, decision-making is more 
rule-based in the committees than in the 
Security Council, where package solutions 
are often negotiated. So non-permanent 
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members potentially have greater influence 
in the committees, but they require solid 
information if they are to introduce pro-
posals. It is therefore significant that almost 
all the sanctions committees are today 
supported by UN panels of experts, which 
monitor implementation of sanctions with 
their own investigations and also include 
arms experts. Where the panels uncover 
incidents of non-compliance there can be 
an impact even without listing, for example 
if those responsible subsequently adapt 
their behaviour or when national authori-
ties draw on information from the reports. 
It can of course be difficult to prove viola-
tions of arms embargoes beyond doubt, 
especially given the numbers of weapons 
already circulating in conflict regions. And 
the panels of experts frequently find them-
selves under financial and political pres-
sures. 
Other monitoring approaches are there-
fore relevant, such as international customs 
cooperation. That was the path pursued by 
the European Union in the 1990s to improve 
the monitoring of sanctions against former 
Yugoslavia. Sanction Assistance Missions 
deployed customs experts to the borders of 
states neighbouring Serbia and Montenegro 
and connected them to the UN sanctions 
committee via a communications centre in 
Brussels. That cannot simply be replicated 
elsewhere, especially given the vital impor-
tance of cooperation by neighbouring states. 
But the example does demonstrate that the 
question of feasibility is principally politi-
cal, and not foremost a matter of capacity. 
This is somewhat different for UN peace 
operations, which are sometimes specifically 
mandated to monitor arms embargoes, as 
in the cases of Central African Republic and 
DR Congo. But it is hard to uphold system-
atic controls in the face of inadequate fund-
ing, where their priority is low. Within UN 
missions there is also often scepticism over 
the usefulness of sanctions. Apart from in-
creased resources, better coordination of the 
different UN measures – which are ultimate-
ly all pursuing the same goal – is required.  
Where control of sea routes is a relevant 
option, the Security Council also authorises 
operations by states and regional organisa-
tions, as in the case of the embargoes on 
Somalia and Libya. For example EU Opera-
tion Irini, mandated in early April 2020, is 
to monitor the UN arms embargo on the 
high seas off the coast of Libya using aerial, 
satellite and maritime assets. Although the 
debate is often narrowed to controls and 
seizures of weapons at sea, Operation Irini’s 
information-gathering role is likely to be 
much more important. This includes col-
lecting and storing evidence, as the German 
draft mandate outlines. It therefore makes 
sense for Germany to participate in the 
operation. Yet, the central point is that any 
findings must be exploited for containing 
the conflict via the UN sanctions system and 
diplomatic processes. As chair of the sanc-
tions committee on Libya, Germany is in 
a position to encourage that. In relation to 
other armed conflicts the German govern-
ment should work to improve implementa-
tion and enforcement of UN arms embar-
goes as part of a comprehensive approach 
to conflict resolution – above and beyond 
its current membership in the Security 
Council. 
Dr. Judith Vorrath is Senior Associate in the International Security Division. 
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